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SUMMARY
Inter governmental supervis ion in phy sic al planning ; An empirical
study of relations between provincial and local authorities.
Intergovernmental supervision is an administrative process in which the central or
regional government monitors the local policy process and intervenes to correct
local decisions in appropriate circumstances, on the strength of a statutory authority
to do so. The legal entitlement may take various forms, e.g. required approval of
local policy decisions or the authority to issue binding directions. Although the kind
of supervision one finds in Dutch intergovernmental relations is historically rooted
in the French system of "tutelage", it never has come to be as ubiquitous an
instrument of centralized power as in France. Almost all present day provisions for
supervision are related to specific types of local decisions, while the exercise of
supervisory authority is subject to various legal constraints.
Although supervision is an important element of intergovernmental relations in a
unitary state, it rarely has been subjected to empirical investigation. The present
study concerns itself with one example: the supervision of local physical planning
by the provincial government. Under the provisions of the Physical Planning Act,
the executive board of the provincial government has the authority both to refuse the
required approval of local land use plans and to direct local governments to comply
with provincial land use policies. The local government must consult with provincial
agencies when preparing a land use plan. kgally, the provincial government seems
to possess formal dominance over local physical planning. A close empirical look at
the system however discloses a variety of intergovernmental policy games that
provincial and local governments play in the shadow of formal regulations. The
most important part of these games is to bc found in the preparatory stage, before the
formal supervisory procedure. More often than not these games exhibit a certain
equality between the players rather than provincial dominance. The foremost goals
of this study are to describe this variety of games and to explain how, under one set
of rules, so much variety can develop. The study deals with two questions: what do
processes of supervision actually look like; and to what extent is the course of such
a process to be explained by the circumstances under which it takes place rather than
by legal reasons? The answer to the fint question will be given in the form of a series
of process types, the answer to the second question in terms of a series of configura-
tions of circumstantial factors that correspond with the process types.
Before going into the empirical findings in more detail, two other matters must be
dealt with: the conceptual model used to depict the supervisory process under
investigation, and the way in which empirical data were collected. The conceptual
model used in this study is based on the literature on interorganizational relations,
notably the exchange approach (trvine and White 1961) and the power-dependency
approach (Schmidt and Kochan 1977). Thus the context in which the supervisory
process unfolds is represented as an interaction system (Boudon 1981) - the super-
visory network - whilst the supervisory process is depicted as an interaction process
between strategically operating actors. Properties of the process taken into account
are communication, reviewing of local policies, and reciprocal use of influence. The
model departs from both the approaches mentioned when stressing the fact that the
interdependencies in the provincial-local relationship cannot be traced entirely to
properties of the parties involved, as in a market situation, but are partly imposed
from outside, that is by law. Much of the interaction that goes on is compulsory and
cannot be avoided.
The empirical data for this study were collected in three two-tier case studies
concerning the workings of the supervisory netwerk in three regional planning areas
(Groningen, Amsterdam-Noordzeekanaalgebied, Noord- en Midden-Limburg).
These studies resulted in a general delineation of the different courses a supervisory
process can take. Within this general framework, a total of eleven cases of super-
visory decision-making were selected and closely scrutinized. The decision-proces-
ses took place in the period from 1978 to 1984, and all had to do with land use plans
in relatively small commununities. In all cases there was some declared provincial
land use policy at stake, and in all cases both the provincial and the local government
tried to persuade or force the other party to accept a certain course of action.
From the material analyzed in this study, it becomes clear that supervisory relations
are seldom hierarchical in nature. Rather, the common supervisory process can be
characterized as partial mutual adjustment. Sometimes either one or both parties
uses administrative force; at other times they come to an exchange agreement or find
some common cause that induces them into cooperation. The various strategies that
both the provincial and local governments adopt make for a great variety ofsuper-
visory processes. The further analysis of the data was aimed at establishing a
relationship between some type of process and the nature of the circumstances in the
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supervisory network in which the process evolves. In the next section the results of
this analysis will be presented, as the types of supervisory processes found are
described together with the sel of circumstances under which they are most likely to
occur.
Type 0: Avoidance
There are very few exit options in the supervisory network. Nevertheless local
government sometimes chooses the strategy of avoiding external meddling by not
taking a formal decision on some land use plan. A local authority is inclined to do
this, if the supervisory authority is percieved as likely to make demands that deviate
very far from the course the authority had set for ilself, while the local government
does not possess the means to resist provincial pr€ssure and its interest in de land use
plan at stake is relatively small.
Type 1 : Non-intervention
The provincial authorities accept the local plan in both the preparatory and supervi-
sory stages of the process without any attempt to make amendments. The local plan
coincides with provincial standards or policy requirements. This may be so entirely
by chance: the local government happens to make a plan that fits provincial policies.
Or it may be that provincial and local authorities have a common understanding
about the range of the supervisory authority's interventions (domain consensus).
Thirdly, both parties may have some premises of decision in common, due to earlier
encounters,
Type 2: Unilateral Adjustment
One of the parties concurs with the other party's demands, in spite of its own goals
and aspirations. Usually it is the local government that conforms to provincial
standards, either in anticipation or on provincial request. A local authority tends to
adopt this strategy as long as it finds the costs of adjustment acceptable compared to
thc costs of thwarting provincial opposition. Provincial unilateral adjustment means
that the provincial government refrains from ascerlaining its own point of view,
despite misgivings over the local plan. It will do so only, if its conception of the
supervisory task leaves room for motives of expediency.
Type 3: Authoritarian Supervision
The supervisory authority reviews the local plan from an entirely local point of view.
Its aim is to uphold standards concerning local planning while the local government
is only interested in realizing the policy choices it has made. The supervisory
relationship is marked by detachment, formal procedures are stressed, the typical
way of influencing the other party is administrative coercion. Conflicts are settled
with formal means such as the refusal of approval, appeals, etc. There is no negotia-
tion, exchange or cooperation.
Type 4: Paternalistic Supervision
Again the intrinsic qualities of the local plan are the supervisory authority's main
concern. However, the provincial authorities do not remain aloof as in the previous
type and the process is rather informal. Although the provincial government has the
legal potential to dominate, it seldom brings this to bear upon the local authorities. It
is rather easily persuaded to give in on its own standards. The local government on
the other hand is also relatively submissive. Disagreement is commonly avoided or
settled through mutual adjustment.
Type 5: Antagonistic Supervision
The supervisory authority judges the local plan in terms of regional land use policies
and is primarily or entirely interested in the supra-local consequences of local
physical planning. Both the provincial and the local government try to realize as
much of their own goals as possible. As in type 3 detachment and formality are
distinguishing features of the supervisory relationship, while administrative coer-
cion is again the primary means of influencing the other party.
Type 6: Codperative Supervision
Again the standards the supervisory authority applies are derived from regional land
use policy. Unlike the situation of type 5 however, both parties have an overriding
interest in reaching an agre€ment, differences of opinion notwithstanding. There is
relatively little aloofness and formality in the way provincial and local authorities
deal with each other. Exchange and cooperation are the typical forms of influence.
In accordance with Boudon's analytical scheme, three levels of explanatory circum-
stance are distinguished: factors inherent in the supervisory situation iself, circum-
stances in the supervisory network (including properties of the actors in the system),
and circumstances in the network's environment. The most important factor inherent
to the supervisory situation is how the primary goals of both parties relate to each
other. Incompatible goals tend to lead to antagonistic processes (types 2, 3 and 5)
while in the case of compatible or common goals exchange and cooperation is likely.
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One important property of the supervisory network is the balance of power between
provincial and local authorities. This balance lies somewhere between provincial
domination and equality. The division of formal power bases strongly favors the
supervisory authority. The balance tends towards equality whenever the provincial
goverment harbors policies for the realisation of which it is dependent on local
activities. Unequal power distribution fosters the occurence of processes of type 2,3
and 5. [:rge inequalities may induce the avoidance strategy of type 1.
Another important aspect of the supervisory network is the dominant view on how
to conduct the supervisory task. Two opposing conceptions exist: the task view and
the instrumental view. According to the instrumental view, the supervisory authority
should seek to advance or protect provincial physical planning policies. When this
view dominates, the occurrence of type 5 and type 6 processes is likely. In the task
view, supervision is a task per se: the supcrvisory authority should guard the
interests of the local community and its inhabitants from possible malfunctioning of
the local authorities. Supervision, executed according to this view, tends to produce
type 3 and type 4 processes.
The most important property of the actors in the network is their tenacity in the face
of opposition from the other party. There are a number of factors that appear to
influence the tenacity of collective actors, notably its negotiated order, the position
of its boundary personel and the relationship between bureaucrats and politicians in
the organization. A great deal of tenacity on both sides typically leads to antagonistic
games like process types 3 and 5. Little or no tenacity on the part of one of the actors
promotes unilateral adjustment. One of the major skills of strategically sophisticated
actors is to know when to persist and when to drop some goal. Such strategies are
usually found in processes of the cooperative type.
Finalty, the way circumstances in the network's environment are consequential for
the course supervisory processes take is best expressed with the term "mobilisation
of bias". This term is derived from Schattschneider, who wrote: "All forms of
political organization have a bias in favor of the exploitation of some kinds of
conflict, and the suppression of others, because organization is the mobilization of
bias. Some issues are organized into politics while others are organized out".
Issues that exist in the environment may be organized into the supervisory network
in such a manner that local and provincial authorities represent opposing interests.
Such a state of affairs tends to produce antagonistic processes. When issues are
organized out of the network, none of the parties in the supervisory process will
bring the matter up, and the possibility for disagreement is reduced. This kind of
mobilisation of bias constitues fertile soil for the paternalistic type of supervision.
